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Abstract 
 
In the 1970s motion picture studios increased their use of blind bidding and 
non-refundable guarantees in an attempt to reduce the risks associated with producing 
a small number of large budget films.  However, theater owners claimed that blind 
bidding and guarantees shifted risk to them and increased the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, since they were required to bid for the right to exhibit a movie without 
seeing it first.  In response to the lobbying of theater owners, twenty-four states passed 
laws between 1978 and 1984 that banned blind bidding, while seven states also 
banned non-refundable guarantees.  This paper provides the first empirical analysis of 
the conflicting claims made by theater owners and movie studios about the impact of 
these laws on the survival rates of independent theaters, admission prices, and delays 
in the release of movies.  We find that the laws were not only ineffective in keeping 
theater owners at risk of bankruptcy from exiting the market; they may have been even 
detrimental to those theater owners converting theaters to multiplexes at that time. 
   3
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The recent bailouts of the U.S. automotive and banking industries have 
generated renewed concern about the incentives that government intervention give 
failing firms in need of significant restructuring. Government intervention to help 
failing firms has a long and varied history. For example, the Robinson-Patman Act 
(1936) has been widely criticized for diminishing the cost advantages of larger, more 
efficient stores at a time when the retail industry was experiencing an increase in 
average store size in response to changing demographics and lower transportation 
costs (Posner, 1976, and Ross, 1984).1 A large literature also suggests a loss in 
efficiency resulting from governmental restrictions on hostile takeovers, such as the 
Williams Act, given that the threat of a hostile takeover can be a mechanism for 
encouraging existing management to restructure failing firms during periods of rapid 
technological change (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). 
 
While identifying the impact of a specific government intervention empirically 
is often difficult, the motion picture industry presents a unique opportunity for a 
natural experiment of government intervention to save failing firms. As a result of the 
Supreme Court’s 1948 landmark decision, United States vs. Paramount et al., the five 
major, vertically integrated studios/distributors were no longer allowed to own 
theaters. The major studios eventually adjusted to this decision and to the changes in 
post-war demographics by producing a smaller number of large budget films and 
changing their distribution strategies.  An important change in their distribution 
strategy was an increased use of non-refundable guarantees and blind bidding, which 
required theater owners to bid six months to one year in advance of a film’s release.  
Since bids were submitted prior to the completion of the movie, theater owners bid 
without seeing a finished copy.2   
 
In response to complaints from theater owners that blind bidding and non-
refundable guarantees were shifting excessive risk to them and would drive them out 
of business, the federal government initially limited the use of blind bidding but then 
removed all restrictions in the mid-1970s. Theater-owner trade associations soon 
convinced 24 states to pass laws banning blind bidding. Seven of the blind bidding 
laws also limited the use of non-refundable guarantees. In this study we find that while 
the strictest of the state laws (that is, the ones that also limited the use of non-
refundable guarantees) helped some theater owners remain in business longer, this 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive debate on the merits of U.S. antitrust enforcement in general, 
see Crandall and Winston (2003) and Baker (2003). 
2 They received only a bid letter summarizing the plot and listing the names of the 
actors.     4
effect was short-lived. We show empirically that the laws, whether they limited 
guarantees or not, could not offset the impact of significant structural changes in the 
market. Prior to the passage of the first law, some theater owners were already 
beginning to increase the number of screens per theater in order to diversify risk and 
exploit economies of scale.  We find that the number of screens per theater was the 
main factor influencing the survival of theater chains during this time period. While 
our main focus is the impact of the laws on theater survival, for completeness we also 
offer empirical evidence concerning the conflicting claims of the theater owners and 
studios about the effect of laws banning blind-bidding and guarantees on ticket prices 
and release dates of new movies. We find no support for theater-owner assertions 
about higher ticket prices in states that permitted blind bidding and the studios’ 
assertions about longer delays in release dates in states that banned blind bidding. 
 
In the next section we review the historical evolution of the blind-bidding laws 
and the literature on contractual relations between the studios and theater owners. In 
Section 3 we present the empirical models and results concerning theater survival. 
Sections 4 and 5 present the evidence of the laws’ impact on prices and delays in 
release dates.  Section 6 provides a conclusion. 
 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC LITERATURE ON 
CONTRACTURAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MOVIE INDUSTRY 
 
  In this section we outline the history of blind bidding leading to the passage of 
the laws banning blind bidding in 24 states between 1978 and 1984 and review the 
theoretical and empirical literature on contractural arrangements in the movie industry. 
This section highlights the significant difference of opinion about the merits of the 
laws at the time of their passage. We also establish our theoretical motivation for the 
empirical model of the next section. We hypothesize that the impact of the laws on 
theater survival would be at best short-lived given the dominating changes in market 
structure due to the transition from one and two-screen theaters to multiplexes.  
 
2.1 An Historical Overview of Blind Bidding Laws 
 
Tension between the studios and independent theater owners dates to the 
1930’s and 1940’s when the five largest studios (Paramount, Loew’s/MGM, Warner 
Brothers, Twentieth Century Fox and RKO) were vertically integrated companies.  
The studios controlled a majority of theaters showing new releases in major cities. 
Vertical integration allegedly minimized competition from independent producers, 
movie companies, and theater owners.  
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 The  Paramount decision in 1948 coincided with the start of a downward 
industry trend that persisted into the early 1970’s.  As argued by Harvard Law Review 
(1979) and Sedgwick (2002) among others, the timing of the theater divestiture did 
not benefit the studios, as the selling coincided with the baby boom phenomenon after 
the end of World War II.  When the war ended, consumers bought homes and durable 
goods for their newly formed families.  While those with higher education and income 
generally frequented movie theaters more often, this segment of the population was 
having children at an historic pace and moving farther away from the centrally located 
theaters which the studios owned.  The studios had to divest their theaters at a time 
when the value of their holdings was declining due to lower box office revenues.   
  
Television accelerated the decline in theater attendance.  By 1954 half of U.S. 
households had a television set.  By 1959, eighty-five percent of households had one 
(Waterman, 2005, p. 34).  Television quickly became the substitute for going to 
theaters. As a result, film output dropped, as the studios concentrated on producing a 
smaller number of large budget films. Figure 1 shows the total number of tickets sold 
between 1970 and 1985, while Figure 2 shows new releases for this time period. By 
1970 the number of new films had reached a low point.   
 
Box office returns also became more volatile than in the pre-television years.  
At the time Variety defined a successful film as one where the domestic rentals 
covered most of the cost of producing the film.  By this definition of success, about 33 
percent of big budget films were successful between 1976 through 1981 (Variety, 
1986, p. 9).  In addition, the most important new releases were concentrated in three 
predictable periods: Christmas, pre-July 4th, and Easter. As a result, some theater 
owners even resorted to closing their doors temporarily for a few weeks or months 
until a peak season would arrive.  Joseph Alterman, executive director of NATO (that 
is, the National Association of Theater Owners), stated in 1977, “This is the first time 
in history that so many large, economically successful theaters closed because there 
were no movies” (Gottschalk, p. 29). The short supply of films allegedly escalated   6
rental terms to a point where even larger theater chains claimed it was difficult to 
compete for them.3  
 
  The Department of Justice was initially sympathetic to the theater owners’ 
argument that blind bidding was responsible for increasing the bankruptcy rate of 
theaters. In response to the increased use of blind bidding, the Department of Justice 
concluded an agreement with the movie studios limiting the number of films which 
could be blind bid from January 1, 1969 to January 1, 1971 to three per studio per 
year.4  The two-year agreement was renewed twice.5  However, the Department of 
Justice revoked all restrictions limiting blind bidding in 1975 and the practice 
accelerated rapidly. Once the Department of Justice removed the restrictions on blind 
bidding, theater owners actively lobbied state governments to ban this practice.  In 
                                                 
3 Theater owners were mostly concerned about the payment of non-refundable 
guarantees that could exceed what they would otherwise have paid through the 
contractural sharing rule. The sharing rule was a sliding scale basis with a higher 
percentage allocated for the movie studios. Theater owners recovered their house 
expenses plus received a lower percentage of the film rental.  In the first few weeks of 
a new release the studios often received the highest of 90 percent of the box office in 
excess of a minimum negotiated house expense (which was called 90/10 percentage 
terms) or 70 percent of the total box office.  The percentage the studios received 
dropped as the film progressed into later runs. See Hanssen (2002) and Filson et al. 
(2005) for a more detailed discussion of the evolution of contractural terms over time. 
4 Blind bidding was made illegal by a 1940 Consent Degree, however, a 1944 District 
Court opinion permitted it as long as exhibitors could reject films which were blind 
bid.   
5 The agreement also allowed theater owners to cancel the bidding arrangement up to 
forty-eight hours before the play-date, but theater owners alleged that it was difficult 
to replace the scheduled movie with anything comparable on short notice.   7
response to NATO’s efforts, twenty-four states banned blind bidding between 1978 
and 1984. Table 1 lists the 24 states that passed a law.   
 
  2.2 Literature  
 
  A study of blind bidding laws also has implications for the vast literature on 
vertical relationships dating back to Coase’s seminal work (1937) on the nature of the 
firm. When complete vertical integration is too costly or not allowed by law, firms 
often resort to alternative contractual arrangements. Despite a literature suggesting 
economic efficiency arguments in favor of many of these vertical relationships, 
several have been the subject of government intervention, such as resale price 
maintenance, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories, and tied sales. In light of the 
efficiency arguments, Easterbrook (2003) has argued that the courts should look more 
favorably on such vertical arrangements. However, as Carlton and Perloff (2004) 
indicate, despite the progress in theoretical modeling of various vertical arrangements, 
there is still a need for more convincing empirical work that identifies both their 
desirable and undesirable effects. 
 
The Paramount decision banned complete vertical integration and required 
bidding on a film by film basis. Harvard Law Review (1979), DeVany and Eckert 
(1991), Devany and Winston and DeVany and Walls (1997), among several others, 
argue that the Paramount decision was ill-advised. For example, according to DeVany 
and Walls (2007), “the Supreme Court has stood in the way of ownership, franchising, 
or other forms of long-term contracting between exhibitors and distributors,” DeVany 
and Eckert and Sedgwick add that the studio system and block booking were 
adaptations to added uncertainty associated with the decision. In addition, Filson 
(2005) shows in a stationary dynamic common agency model with two distributors   8
and one exhibitor that complete vertical integration can be privately profitable and 
socially beneficial due a more favorable pattern of release dates and run lengths.  
 
While there is an extensive literature documenting and analyzing all aspects of 
the resultant vertical contractual relationships in the movie industry, a primary focus 
of empirical work has been the uncertainty of predicting success of individual movies 
and the impact of this uncertainty on contractural sharing arrangements due to risk 
aversion of both the studios and theater owners. For example, in a series of articles 
DeVany and Walls attempt to identify the predictors of such outcomes as run length 
and domestic box office receipts. DeVany and Walls (1997) provide empirical 
evidence that the number of theaters showing the movie in its first run was the only 
economically meaningful predictor of run length. Blumenthal (1989) finds empirically 
that this factor is also an important determinant of the level of winning bids by theater 
owners. DeVany and Walls (1999) add that their empirical results imply that anything 
can happen and that film makers “don’t know anything” about the potential success of 
a given movie. They suggest that “the difficulties of predicting outcomes for 
individual movies are so severe that a strategy of choosing portfolios of movies may 
be preferred to the current practice of ‘greenlighting’ individual movie projects” (p. 
315). 
 
Despite the more recent empirical evidence in the literature concerning the 
difficulty of predicting success, the informational value associated with seeing the 
movie prior to bidding on it was the subject of a heated debate at the time of the 
passage of the laws banning blind bidding. For example, DeVany and Eckert echo a 
common complaint from studios and distributors that trade screenings were poorly 
attended and that trade screening did little to affect the sharing rules or predict 
success.  
 
On the other hand, while theater owners admitted to attending only some of the 
previews, they complained of the lack of the option of attending a trade screening in 
order to avoid the worst of the movies, “pigs in a poke,” that might result in having to 
pay a binding guarantee or to miss an otherwise unexpected blockbuster. For example, 
in a memo to the Massachusetts legislature in support of banning blind bidding in that 
state, John Shenefield, an assistant U.S. attorney, summarized this view by stating that 
“[Blind Bidding] denies exhibs the right to make an informed judgment as to artistic 
or box-office merit, tying up playing time, forcing huge guarantees, and resulting in 
‘examples that can be cited of exhibitors having been driven into bankruptcy by 
inferior films which were blind bid” (Jacobson, 1978). Even Jack Valenti, the 
President of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) at the time, in his 
public arguments in favor of blind bidding implied that theater owners might be able 
to determine which movies would be blockbusters. “With the intense competition 
between big theater chains, when a movie is shown at a screening and it’s an obvious   9
smash, the bidding will go right through the ceiling.  Exhibitors will bid more and will 
charge more at the box office” (Gottschalk, Jr., 1979, p. 1). 
 
Studios argued that blind bidding provided a timely return on investment and 
advanced coordination of the film’s release date with promotional efforts and booking 
of television advertisements, which were secured six months to one year in advance.  
They claimed that there would be lengthy delays in release dates without blind 
bidding.  Since films were completed close to their release date, a requirement to show 
the movies in advance of the bidding process (that is, trade screening) may not have 
allowed enough time for films to arrive by the anticipated release date.  Guarantees 
allowed the studios a minimum expected return on their investments and offset the 
allegedly common practice of slow payment of film rentals by theater owners. 
  
On the other hand, theater owners alleged that overbidding due to blind 
bidding and guarantees resulted in many of them going out of business and raised 
admission prices due to the theater owners’ need to cover extensive losses from 
overbid films. They also claimed that higher rental terms would make it more difficult 
for some theater owners to obtain blockbuster films, since they would not be able to 
outbid the larger theater chains.   
 
The exhibition market was undergoing important structural change at the time 
the states were passing laws banning blind bidding. The box office success of Jaws in 
1975 marked a change in release strategy at the same time as theater owners were 
lobbying for legal intervention.  Universal released the film simultaneously in 500 
theaters (Paul, 1994).  This strategy was intended to take advantage of the mass 
advertising campaign which touted the film.  Previously, movie companies commonly 
kept the number of prints below 400 in order to keep down costs (Gottschalk, Jr., p. 
46).  This number increased to between 1,000 and 1,500 by the early 1980’s (Myers, 
1983, p. 278).  
 
While DeVany and Walls (1999) suggested that studios could reduce risk by 
diversification of their portfolio of movies at any point in time, some risk-averse 
theater owners were beginning to accomplish the same result by increasing the 
number of screens at existing theaters and building new multiplex theaters in shopping 
centers and malls. Figure 3 displays the large overall growth in the number of screens 
from 1970 to 1985.6 Theater owners had several reasons to switch to multiple screens.  
First, theater owners were adding screens to reduce risk. Second, multiplex theaters, 
especially new ones, were designed to best exploit concession sales, because the 
                                                 
6 In 1978, only 10 percent of indoor theaters were multiplexes; while 80 percent were 
twin theaters (International Motion Picture Almanac, 1978, p. 31A.).   10
design of the buildings focused on a centrally located concession stand. Third, theater 
owners were expanding to shopping centers.  Since shopping center developers 
constructed the theaters, theater owners limited their investment to the furniture, 
fixtures, and equipment.7  
  
Our contribution to the literature is empirical evidence that supports blind 
bidding and guarantees as a logical efficiency-enhancing alternative to complete 
vertical integration during this period of significant structural change in the industry.  
As early as 1979 The Harvard Law Review questioned the impact of laws banning 
blind-bidding on market-efficiency and legal grounds. However, in addition to Carlton 
and Perloff’s call for more empirical evidence of the benefits and consequences of 
vertical arrangements in general, Orbach and Einav (2007) note that while the practice 
of blind bidding is as controversial as block booking, empirical evidence of its 
consequences is lacking. 
  
For example, despite the criticism of the state laws in the literature and the 
questions about the informational value of trade screening, the only empirical study of 
the impact of blind bidding, Blumenthal (1989), concluded that theater owners were 
justified in opposing blind bidding and initiating requests for legislative relief.8 In a 
natural experiment using contractural data on successful bids in 1982 by one theater 
chain with theaters in both blind bid and preview states, Blumenthal found that 
winning bids were lower in states that allowed blind bidding.  She argued, however, 
that in blind-bid states the unfavorable impact on theater owners’ risk due to increased 
variance in quality of the theater owner’s successful bids was relatively greater than 
the favorable impact of the decrease in guarantees necessary to win the bidding.  
 
  Blumenthal defined the bid as the guarantee, claiming that other contractural 
terms, such as percentage share or guaranteed length of run, generally did not vary 
                                                 
7 “The exhibition company that leases property may spend only $100,000 to $150,000 
to equip and modestly furnish each auditorium, and it does not need to tie up capital in 
cinder and cement” (Guback, 2001, p. 129). 
8 Forsythe, Isaac, and Palfrey (1989) used blind bidding as motivation for laboratory 
experiments with n buyers and one seller in a sealed-bid, first-price auction.  They 
concluded that their results implied that the anti-blind bidding laws were unnecessary 
as buyers would learn that a seller withholds information when it is unfavorable.  In 
their model a seller would abandon blind bidding once all buyers learn that 
withholding information was in the seller’s best interest and not theirs.  However, the 
studios generally did just the opposite by trade screening relatively less desirable films 
and blind bidding highly anticipated films. 
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much across bid letters.  Filson et al. mention “in practice, the floor is the relevant 
payment the vast majority of times (p. 356)”. In Blumenthal’s sample the guarantee 
was binding twenty-four percent of the time.9 Blumenthal’s empirical results of a 
lower average winning guarantee and higher variance in blind-bid states lend further 
support to those arguing that trade screening did provide information to theater owners 
beyond that available in the bid letter. Although a lack of information about the 
quality of the movie at the time of the bidding may have no effect on the percent share 
of revenues received by exhibitors, it could increase the probability of having to 
exhibit a movie during the peak season even though the guarantee significantly 
exceeded the value of the movie to the theater owner. Given the important role of the 
non-refundable guarantee in the bidding process and the uncertainty associated with 
not having the opportunity of seeing the movie in advance, theater owners argued that 
there was a greater likelihood of having several peak seasons of showing movies at a 
loss with blind bidding and could lead to bankruptcy. As Filson et al. conclude, 
“Operating a theater involves many fixed costs that cannot be avoided without 
exiting…These differences (relative to distributors) may make exhibitors more 
reluctant to bear downside revenue risk than distributors (p. 368). 
 
While the debate over the magnitude of the informational value of trade 
screening is interesting in its own right, studio heads argued that any benefit due to an 
increase in its informational value came at an even higher loss of efficiency. For 
example, Mr. Valenti argued that “the end of blind bidding would mean fewer big 
budget, blockbuster movies …. movie companies just won’t be able to put so much 
money into a film if they don’t know for sure they have play-dates in theaters at one of 
the prime times” (Gottschalk, Jr., 1979). According to Valenti, “a substantial 
slowdown –let alone outright cutoff – of such revenue [from guarantees] would have a 
serious impact on production” (Variety, 1977, p. 7). 
 
Of particular importance to our empirical approach is the role of diversification 
at the theater level on theater survival and market efficiency. Blumenthal’s conclusion 
about the impact of blind bidding ignored the structural changes taking place in the 
market at that time. In arriving at her policy conclusion, Blumenthal implicitly 
assumed that theater owners showed only one movie at a time. As a result, she did not 
mention or account for the fact that winning bids during this time period could have 
been heavily influenced by the increased competition from larger, more diversified 
chains that benefited from the lower winning bids per movie relative to the less 
diversified theater owners, while being less affected by the increased variance in box 
                                                 
9 For example, DeVany and Eckert argue that theater owners complained primarily 
about having to bid for movies and that the binding guarantee, not the sharing rules, 
were the most onerous condition of the blind-bidding process.   12
office receipts per movie associated with blind bidding. As Marvin Goldman, 
president of  NATO during the time of the passage of the laws, explained that “if you 
have one theater with one thousand seats and you have a film not doing well, you’re in 
trouble”, but “if you have a six one hundred sixty seat theaters, you might have three 
or four winners and two or three losers.  You’re better off,” (Gottschalk, p. 29).   
 
As a result, sufficiently diversified theater owners in blind bid states would be 
less concerned about overbidding on any one movie and could benefit from the lower 
average guarantee. Multiplex owners, therefore, lost the benefit of being able to offer 
lower guarantees on average in states that required trade screening.   In other words, 
blind bidding laws actually could have harmed theater owners that had adapted to the 
changing market conditions during the transition period while in the end not helping 
those who resisted the change.   
 
In addition to our hypothesized effect of the laws on theater survival, one 
would thus not be surprised by our empirical finding in the next section that the 
likelihood of survival at this time increased with the number of screens per theater 
both in states allowing and banning blind bidding.  In fact, we find that the magnitude 
of the marginal effect of the number of screens per theater is essentially identical 
across our data samples and empirical models.  
 
3. BLIND BIDDING, GUARANTEES AND SURVIVAL  
 
  As noted in the previous section, while there has been no lack of assertions 
about the expected consequences of the blind bidding laws and the informational 
value of trade screening, there has been no empirical study isolating the impact of the 
laws on the survival of theater owners. In this section we analyze the impact of the 
laws on the survival of theaters in two ways. Initially, we use a natural experiment to 
compare a sample of theaters in three states that passed similar laws banning blind 
bidding but not guarantees in 1979 (Georgia, Tennessee, and North Carolina) with a 
sample of theaters in Florida that never had such a law. We choose these states 
because of their similarity in size, regional location, and the timing of the passage of 
their laws. 
 
As mentioned in section 2, Blumenthal also used a natural experiment in her 
study of contractural arrangements across blind-bid and trade-screen states. A natural 
experiment is especially suited for a study of blind bidding, given that the passage of 
the laws appears to be idiosyncratic and unrelated to exit rates prior to passage of the 
law.10  For example, NATO believed it was easier to pass the law in states with year-
                                                 
10 One cannot assume exogeneity of the treatment samples arbitrarily. For example, 
several authors, such as Kroszner and Strahan (1999), Zhang (2007), and Rosston et   13
long legislatures, since it was easier for opponents of the laws to table the measure in 
states with part-time legislatures. If a bill were not passed during the legislative year, 
it would have to be reintroduced the following year (Robbins, 1981).   
 
The only consistent difference is state size. One explanation mentioned to us 
by trade association executives at the time and suggested by the Harvard Law Review 
article (footnote 90) was that the MPAA concentrated its lobbying efforts in the 
largest states for fear that passage by a critical of mass of the largest states would by 
itself mean the end of blind bidding. However, efforts to pass a law in New Jersey 
were unsuccessful despite a legislature that worked year round and a state Senate vote 
in favor of prohibiting blind bidding of 29-0 in 1979 (Variety, October 31, 1979). In 
the years which followed NATO continued its unsuccessful efforts to pass the law in 
New Jersey knowing that the law did not need to be voted on by the Senate.  
 
Finally, we do not find evidence that the theaters in our sample had 
significantly higher exit rates prior to the passage of the legislation. For example, 
between 1977 and 1981 Tennessee did have a much higher average rate of 48.65%, 
but the exit rates in Georgia (30.43%) and North Carolina (33.33%) were close to that 
of Florida (30.51%). Together, the weighted average for the three states that 
eventually banned blind bidding was slightly higher than that of Florida at 37.27%. 
  
  We use a probit analysis to model the probability of survival controlling for 
theater-specific, market-specific, and theater-chain-specific factors. Probit models 
have been used often to examine firm survival.11 The probit model assumes that the 
likelihood that an event occurs depends on an unobservable index function.  In this 
case, each theater has a critical index of profitability above which the theater exits the 
market.  The critical values are assumed to follow a normal distribution. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
al. (2008) have shown that certain political economy variables can be important in 
explaining a state’s decision to deregulate banking, electricity and local telephone 
markets, respectively. 
11 For example, Dunne, Klimek, and Roberts (2005) recently examine the survival 
rates of seven regional manufacturing industries in the U.S. using plant level data.     14
  We find that the laws of Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee did not have 
a statistically significant impact on the survival of theaters.  Given the lack of an 
impact of the law in these states, we use a second natural experiment with more 
detailed panel data for a sample of theaters in the two largest states with the strictest 
laws: Ohio and Pennsylvania.  The Ohio and Pennsylvania blind-bidding laws were 
considered the most restrictive, because they also banned the requirement of including 
non-refundable guarantees in the bid letter.   
 
  We compare the survival rates of theaters in Ohio and Pennsylvania with those 
in the similarly sized states of Michigan and New York. Neither Michigan nor New 
York had laws against blind bidding or guarantees. Table 2 shows that exit rates are 
not systemically higher in Ohio or Pennsylvania prior to the passage of the laws. In 
fact, the weighted average exit rate is higher in the two blind-bid states relative to that 
in the preview states both before and after passage of the laws. We find that the laws 
of Ohio and Pennsylvania had an initial impact on survival times. However, the laws’ 
effect diminished rapidly over time and was completely reversed within a few years.   
As mentioned in the previous section, we provide empirical evidence that the number 
of screens, not laws banning blind bidding and guarantees, was the most important 
factor in predicting a theater’s survival. In fact, the number of screens per theater had 
essentially identical effects on the probability of survival in all the states.  
 
  3.1  Probit Analysis of Banning Blind Bidding   15
 
  Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee all passed similar legislation in 1979 
banning blind bidding but permitting guarantees.  We treat the passage of the anti-
blind bidding laws as a natural experiment and use theaters in Florida, which did not 




  To estimate the immediate impact of the laws we use data for the two years 
before and after the passage of the laws (that is, 1977 and 1981).  The data consist of 
229 theaters from the largest thirteen cities in the four states: Florida (119), Georgia 
(46), North Carolina (27), and Tennessee (37).12  We compiled the data set in the 
following manner.  For the first week of June 1977 and June 1981, we recorded the 
name of all first-run theaters from local newspapers, the number of screens at each 
theater, and the name of the parent theater chain if relevant.  Since we could not 
always identify the theater chain which operated a theater, we used the International 
Motion Picture Almanac (IMPA) to obtain additional information.  The newspapers 
listed theaters in the city and in the nearby suburbs as well, therefore the data include 
the entire metropolitan area.     
 
                                                 
  12 Data come from local newspapers in the following cities Fort 
Lauderdale, Jacksonville, Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, Florida; Atlanta, Columbus, 
and Savannah, Georgia; Charlotte and Raleigh, North Carolina; and Knoxville, 
Memphis, and Nashville, Tennessee. 
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3.1.2 Empirical Model and Results 
 
  We include controls for theater-specific, market-specific, and theater-chain-
specific factors.13 The number of screens per theater is a control for economies of 
scale, quality, and the potential for risk reduction through diversification.14  Theaters 
with more screens can diversify the risk of committing to any one film, are more cost 
efficient, and offer more choices to consumers (a measure of quality). We include the 
number of screens per theater in 1977 and expect this variable to be inversely related 
to probability of exiting the market.15  
 
  We included a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the total screens per 
theater chain in the local market in order to control for the degree of market 
concentration. In industry-specific studies, high concentration ratios and HHIs are 
associated with lower entry rates.  For this reason, we expect this variable to be 
negatively related to exit.  We include the total number of screens a theater chain 
operated in the U.S. as a control for firm size.  We are unable to measure consistently 
the initial size of theater chains, so we include the total number of screens in the U.S. 
                                                 
13 While studies of firm survival sometimes include additional controls for the age of 
the firm, we were unable to find useable data on the age of movie theaters in our 
sample. For example, attempts to do so by direct contact of theaters and industry 
insiders were not fruitful. We have no reason, however, to expect that there was a 
sufficiently large enough systematic differences in theater age across our samples 
given similarities in regional location and city size. 
 
14 We also estimated the models with a quadratic term for the number of screens per 
theater. Even in the few cases when the coefficient for this variable was statistically 
significant, the estimated coefficients for the other variables were essentially 
unchanged. We find this same result for all the estimations reported in this paper. 
15 We assume that a theater exits the market if any one of the following occurs: (1) the 
theater owner leaves the market through the sale of the property to a theater chain or 
property developer, (2) a theater is no longer listed in the newspaper, or (3) a theater 
no longer exhibits first-run films.     17
as of 1975.  A priori, we anticipate that larger theater chains are less likely to exit.  We 
include a dichotomous variable with a value of one if the theater was in Georgia, 
Tennessee, or North Carolina and zero otherwise.  
 
  Table 3 provides the results along with summary statistics for each variable. 
The HHI and the total number of screens a theater operates in the U.S. do not have a 
statistically significant effect.  As hypothesized in the previous section, the number of 
screens at the theater is the only variable with a statistically significant coefficient at 
the 5 percent level. An increase in the number of screens at a theater decreases the 
probability of the theater exiting during this time period on the margin by 
approximately fifteen percent. Most importantly, controlling for the number of screens 
at the theater and other industry characteristics, we find that theaters in Georgia, North 
Carolina, and Tennessee did not have statistically different exit rates than those in 
Florida.  
 
  3.2 The Impact of Banning Both Blind Bidding and Required Guarantees  
 
  It is possible that the laws in Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee did not 
have an impact, because the laws did not also ban the requirement of paying 
guarantees.  As a result, we next considered the effects of the presumably most 
restrictive laws of Ohio, passed in October 1978, and Pennsylvania, passed in May 
1980. Both laws banned blind bidding and the requirement of including non-
refundable guarantees in the bid letter. While these laws were generally regarded as   18
the most restrictive because of the ban on the requirement of non-refundable 
guarantees, there is anecdotal evidence that at least some theater owners in Ohio 
continued to offer them (Harvard Law Review, footnote 56). For this reason, one 
might conclude that the additional ban on the requirement of a guarantee would have 
had limited impact, because theater owners continued to offer them anyway despite 
the risk that the guarantee could be binding. We again use a natural experiment this 
time using theaters in two similarly sized nearby states, Michigan and New York, as 




  While we collected data comparable to the first sample in order to conduct a 
probit analysis, we also expanded the data set for a more detailed survival analysis. 
Our data for the survival analysis include annual data starting with the year 1977 and 
extending to the year 1985 for 724 movie theaters from the twenty-two largest cities in 
Ohio (204), Michigan (135), Pennsylvania (178), and New York (207).16 We recorded 
all theaters listed in the local newspaper for each city every year from 1977 to 1985.  
Each year was a snapshot of the market on the final Friday before the 4
th of July, one 
of the peak periods in the year.   
 
                                                 
16 Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown, Ohio; 
Detroit, Grand Rapids, and Lansing, Michigan; Erie, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, and Scranton, Pennsylvania; and Bronx, Brooklyn, Buffalo, Manhattan, 
Queens, Staten Island, and Rochester, New York.   19
  We used several other references to fill gaps in the data.  The IMPA is an 
annual publication that listed large, medium, and small exhibition chains.  However, it 
did not provide a complete listing of all theater chains.  In 1975, the almanac 
accounted for about 53 percent of total screens.  The remaining information came 
from Variety, two internet sources (cinematreasures.org and cinematour.com), and 
Motor City Marquees, a thorough reference about theaters in the Detroit Area from 
1906-1992.  We also contacted several theater owners from the blind bidding years for 
additional clarifications: Joel Resnick, former President of NATO; Bruce Olson, 
Senior Vice President of Marcus Theaters; Dick Fox, former President of Fox 
Theaters of Reading, Pennsylvania; and Jerome Gordon, President of Mid-Atlantic 
NATO. 
 
3.2.2. Probit Results 
 
  While the laws for the three states in our first sample did not have a 
statistically significant effect on the exit rate, the laws in Ohio and Pennsylvania do.  
Table 4 shows that after passage of the laws, ceteris paribus, theater owners in Ohio 
and Pennsylvania were more likely to stay in business longer than those in the other 
states. Interestingly, the coefficient for the number of screens per theater is essentially   20
identical to that for the first sample, while as before none of the other control variables 
had a statistically significant effect on the exit rate.17  
 
  3.3 Survival Analysis  
 
  While a probit analysis provides an approximation of the effect of the laws 
over an extended period of time, a theater’s propensity to survive may change as time 
passes. Survival analysis permits the use of time-varying covariates, while the probit 
analysis does not. The hazard function, ) (t h , is defined as 
  
t
t T t t T t
t h
t 






    (1) 
The numerator represents the probability a theater survives between t and t  , given 
that it has survived up to that point in time.  The inclusion of the conditional statement 
is necessary, because some theaters may have already exited the market by period t.  
Since the numerator alone is a non-decreasing function of t, it is divided by t  .  In 
addition, the hazard includes the limit of Δt representing increasingly smaller intervals 
of t and t   until a limiting value is reached. 
 
  In this model  i T  is a random variable representing time for the ith individual 
so that   
                                                 
17 Re-estimation of the model after dropping all variables with statistically 
insignificant coefficients did not change the results. We found this same result for all 
the remaining estimations reported in this paper.    21
     i ik k i i x x T          ... log 1 1 0 ,   (3) 
where ik x  are predictor variables, i   is a random error term, and  k   ,..., 0  and   are 
parameters to be estimated.  We assume that i   follows a Weibull distribution.18  The 
Weibull model assumes i   follows the extreme value distribution with the probability 
density function, )} exp( exp{ ) ( i i i f      .  For   equal to 1, the Weibull model 
simplifies to the exponential function which has a constant hazard function.  For   
greater than 1, the hazard decreases over time.  When 0.5 <   < 1, the hazard 
increases at a decreasing rate.  When 0 <   < 0.5, the hazard increases at an 
increasing rate.  When   equals 0.5, the hazard function is an increasing straight line 
from the origin. 
 
3.3.1 Explanatory Variables 
 
  In addition to controlling for the number of screens per theater, we also include 
controls for prior entry and exit of competitors, and industry level measures of the 
number of new releases and total tickets sold.19 Numerous empirical studies find that 
                                                 
18 For a detailed discussion of the properties and applicability of this model, see 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005). Parametric survival models are common in studies of 
firm survival. For example, McCloughan and Stone (1998) used this model to 
investigate the shape of the hazard function for foreign manufacturing plants and to 
determine whether greenfield investments survive longer than acquisition plants.  In 
addition, Chen (2002) utilized a Weibull model to examine the lifetimes of petroleum 
refining plants after the deregulation of crude oil markets.   
19 As previously, we also estimated the model using a quadratic term for screens per 
theater with no change in the coefficients of the other variables. An increase in the   22
entry and exit rates are positively correlated phenomena: higher (lower) entry rate 
industries are also higher (lower) exit rate industries (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 
1988).  As a result, we use the gross entry rate in the local market as a control 
variable.  We define the gross entry rate as the number of new theaters divided by the 
total number of theaters in the current year.  Since the dependent variable is time, 
higher entry rates imply shorter survival times for exiting theaters, ceteris paribus. 
 
  Through the early 1980’s theater owners frequently complained about the 
shortage of films.  We expect more releases in a given year to extend how long a 
theater owner will survive. However, the movie studios’ focus on large-budget films 
in the early 1970’s also affected theater attendance.  We include the aggregate number 
of tickets sold per year as a covariate and expect that stronger demand correlates with 
theater owners remaining in operation longer. 
 
  As before, we include a dichotomous variable to capture the effect of the laws.  
However, a dichotomous variable is only one way for capturing the effect of the law in 
a duration model.  It is possible that the relationship between a theater owners’ 
survival and the laws may be more complex.  For this reason, we also test for the 
length of the impact of the law by interacting this variable with a dichotomous 
variable for the years 1982 to 1985.  
                                                                                                                                              
number of screens per theater increases the probability of survival at a decreasing rate 
as the number of screens increases.   23
 
  We measure the number of tickets sold and the entry rate as a one-period lag 
and the number of new releases as a one-period lead.  We assume theater owners used 
the previous year’s box office success as an indication of how successful the present 
year would be.  However, theater owners are generally aware in time t of the number 






  Our estimates of the parameters of the duration model for Ohio, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania and New York are shown in Table 5.  Since the laws in Ohio and 
Pennsylvania were passed a year and a half apart, we also present results separately 
for these two states in comparison to both New York and Michigan both with and 
without the interaction term controlling for the longer term effect of the laws. 
 
  The results are similar in all cases. The coefficient for the number of screens 
per theater is positive and statistically significant, indicating that a theater with more 
screens stayed in business longer.  The coefficients for the number of new releases and 
number of tickets sold are positive and statistically significant. We find that the 
coefficient for local rate of entry is not statistically different from zero. 
   24
  As was the case in the probit analysis, the laws result in longer survival times 
when measured only by the dichotomous variable.  Controlling for the possibility that 
the impact varied over time, we find that the impact of the laws was significantly and 
positively correlated with survival times from 1978 to 1981. However, theaters left the 
market at a faster rate in these states starting in 1982. As a result, while the laws 
initially encouraged some theater owners to stay in business longer, theater owners 
eventually realized that the law was not going to sustain them. As in the case of the 
probit results, theater owners that survived had adjusted by increasing the number of 
screens per theater.   
 
  The estimated Weibull parameter, , ranges between 0.25 and 0.33 and is 
significantly greater than zero but less than one.  Since the null hypothesis that   
equals 1 is rejected, the theater data are not consistent with an exponential model. 
More specifically, the function follows the pattern of positive duration dependence: 
the hazard rate of exit remains lower for earlier years but it increases at an increasing 
rate in later years.20 
 
  3.4 Summary of Results  
 
  Overall, we find that the laws banning only blind bidding had no effect on the 
likelihood of a theater owner staying in business, while the stricter laws that banned 
                                                 
20 We also estimated a Cox Proportional Hazards model with the same variables as a 
robustness check with essentially identical results (that is, only changes in the third 
significant digit).   25
both blind bidding and obligatory guarantees had a limited and short-lived effect that 
was soon reversed. In our samples we found that the one consistent factor in theater 
survival was the number of screens at the theater. We also found that there were forces 
that resulted in a rising probability that traditional theaters would exit the market. As a 
result, even though the strictest laws delayed the switchover to multiplexes for a short 
time, the inevitable structural change in the exhibition market soon offset the impact 
of these laws.  
 
4. ADMISSION PRICES  
 
  While the main focus of our empirical work is the impact of the laws on the 
survival of theaters, we also investigate the opposing claims made by theater owners 
and studios concerning the impact of the laws banning bidding laws on admission 
prices.  As noted earlier, the studios and distributors argued that ticket prices were 
lower in states allowing blind bidding, while theater owners argued that prices were 
higher. We test these claims using data from the two trade-screen states of Ohio and 
Pennsylvania. We use a natural experiment of average admission prices in Cleveland, 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh before and after the passage of the laws compared to those 
in the comparably sized city of Detroit and find evidence that the ticket prices were 
somewhat lower after passage of the laws in states allowing blind bidding. We provide 
a possible explanation for why one may not be surprised by this result. Data come 
from the weekly survey in Variety of the average ticket prices for specific movies in   26
the relatively larger market cities. These cities were chosen primarily because of their 
consistent listing in Variety’s survey of large metropolitan markets.  
 
  4.1. Background  
 
  There is no consistent empirical evidence in the literature on the impact of 
blind bidding on ticket prices. For example, the impact of blind bidding on ticket 
prices was not a part of Blumenthal’s study, since she only focused on guarantees. 
DeVany and Eckert suggest that contractual arrangements focused on the guarantee 
and the sharing rule did not differ across trade-screen and blind-bid states. Given that 
the sharing rule is more closely associated with marginal cost and guarantees, when 
binding, are fixed costs, there should be no difference in ticket prices across blind-bid 
and trade-screen states.  
 
  In addition, a recent literature documents the general industry practice of 
constant admission prices across motion pictures at a given theater and over time for a 
specific motion picture regardless of demand (Filson et al. and Orbach and Einav, 
2007). There appears, however, at least more recently to be some variation in prices 
due to the degree of market competition.  For example, using data from 1993 to 1997, 
Davis finds that admission prices are slightly lower in more competitive markets.  
While there is price discrimination across consumer groups (adults, children under 
twelve years of age, seniors over sixty years of age, and veterans), there appears to be   27
little use of price discrimination by time of day or day of the week until more recently 
(Davis, 2005).   
 
  While there is no empirical evidence in the literature that addresses the impact 
of blind bidding on ticket prices, theater owners argued that blind bidding would result 
in higher prices. For example, A. Alan Friedberg, the NATO president, asserted that 
losses associated with overbidding on poor quality movies due to blind bidding added 
about 10 percent to film rentals each year, and without it, that savings could be passed 
along to the general public (Jacobson, 1979).  It is not clear, however, given a 
mutually beneficial goal of revenue maximization by both the distributors and 
exhibitors in both trade-screen and blind-bid states why theater owners have an 
incentive to seek a different price schedule in blind-bid states following an unexpected 
series of losses on earlier movies.  
 
On the other hand, while the distributors’ main marginal cost per film is due to 
advertising expenditures, they apparently incurred additional expenses in trade-
screened states due to the costs of sales prints especially made for the purpose of trade 
screening. According to Barry Reardon, distributional president at Warner Brothers, 
the additional expense to trade screen amounted to approximately $50,000 per film 
(Robbins, 1985, p. 80). However, given that this additional cost is a fixed cost and the 
distributors’ desire to maximize revenue for any given movie; it is also not clear why 
this would lead to a higher price in only trade-screen states. 
 
  Taken as a whole, it is therefore not clear from these arguments why ticket 
prices would vary across blind-bid and trade-screen states. However, admission 
pricing in the movie industry appears to be at odds with the predictions of traditional   28
pricing models. For example, theater owners and distributors have potentially 
conflicting incentives concerning admission prices.  While they both share box office 
receipts, theater owners keep all of concessions sales.  As a result, the impact of a 
price decrease on a theater owner’s marginal revenue may be more favorable relative 
to that of the distributor, at least at times of excess theater capacity.  While theater 
owners could have specified lower price schedules in their bids to the distributors, 
they might have lost the right to show the movie given the available information about 
its prospects at the time.  As a result, prices were generally determined a priori 
implicitly by the distributors in order to maximize sales revenue with the most 
significant variation across contracts coming from the guarantee (Filson et al).21  
 
As mentioned earlier, while Blumenthal did not consider the admission price 
schedule as a part of the bids, the lower winning guarantees and greater variance in 
box office revenues did imply the possibility of informational value of trade screening. 
To the extent there was greater uncertainty about movie quality in blind bid states at 
least as it pertains to the optimal price schedule, it would not be surprising to find 
relatively more downward flexibility in pricing schedules in these states at least ex 
post. For example, Filson et al. state that contractural terms pertaining to the price 
schedule, along with requirements concerning number of shows per week and theater 
size, were suggestive and rarely enforced. (p. 356). As a result, while we see no reason 
to expect ticket prices to be higher in states allowing blind bidding, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that they could be lower. 
 
  4.2. Data and Methods 
 
                                                 
21 Recently Moul (2007) uses a structural model to measure the degree of collusion 
among distributors.  In order to estimate his model he assumes that admission prices 
are exogenous to both distributors and exhibitors on a weekly basis.   29
  We obtained the data from Variety, which sampled between ten and twenty 
theaters weekly from fifteen cities in the U.S. We compare prices in the three cities of 
Cleveland, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh with those of Detroit.  We sampled each city 
quarterly. Each sample included cities in the entire metropolitan area. For example, 
Detroit included theaters from surrounding areas of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb 
counties. 
 
  Since theater owners bid on films six months to one year in advance of the 
release date, we cannot be completely sure which films were blind bid during the first 
year that the anti-blind bidding laws were in effect.  For example, Ohio enacted the 
law in October 1978, but theater owners may have bid for films to be released in April 
1979 or as far away as October 1979.  We address the possible lagged effect of the law 
on films by examining admission prices using two different time periods: (1) two 
years before and after a law, and (2) three years before and after a law. As before, we 
consider the passage of the Ohio and Pennsylvania laws a natural experiment and 
compare the change in the population means.  We assume that relative changes in 
price approximate the effect of the law.22   
 
                                                 
22 We were unable to find suitable data on possible explanatory variables, such as 
proxies for consumer preferences, for a detailed panel study of the price changes. 
However, given the similarity of the states and the short time period, we are not 
optimistic that there would be sufficient variation over time studied to affect our 
results.   30
  Figure 4 displays average admission prices for Cleveland and Detroit from 
1975 to 1981.  Detroit’s average prices remain consistently above Cleveland’s 
throughout.  Average admission prices for Cleveland and Detroit remain relatively 
steady before the implementation of the law, implying the assumption of a common 
trend appears valid. Table 6 shows that Detroit’s prices increase by seven cents and 
Cleveland’s rise by 16 cents after passage of the law.  Since the seven cent increase in 
average prices is assumed to control for how Cleveland’s prices would have changed 
in the absence of the law, the Ohio law significantly increases Cleveland’s average 
prices by nine cents.  Cleveland’s relative average prices are lower by only one cent, 
however, when we compare prices starting three years prior to the passage of the law. 
 
  Figure 5 shows average prices in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh versus those in 
Detroit from 1977 to 1983.  For the first two years, prices are nearly identical.  In 
1979 and 1980, the difference in average prices remains relatively steady at 10 and 15 
cents, respectively.  Beyond 1980, the difference in average prices increases, ranging 
from 36 to 41 cents.  Table  7 shows that average prices for Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh rise after the passage of Pennsylvania’s law by 43 cents while Detroit’s 
increases by 11 cents for a statistically significant 32-cent increase in admission 
prices.  When we extend the time period to a total of six years, the law causes higher 




  For completeness we also examined the claim made by movie studios that the 
laws would significantly delay the release of films. The studios warned of delays of 
three to six months, while even some theater owners expected delays of at most one 
month (Brill, 1978). We add to our investigation of the impact of the anti-blind 
bidding laws of Ohio and Pennsylvania by considering the possibility of delays in 
these two states.    Because of consistent inclusion in Variety of the largest 
metropolitan markets in these two states, we paired Cleveland with Detroit and 
Philadelphia with New York City.  We do not find evidence that the two trade-screen 
cities of Cleveland and Philadelphia exhibit films relatively later after the passage of 
the laws. 
 
  Despite the studios’ statements to the contrary, a lack of significant systematic 
delays in trade screen states should not be surprising. To this day release dates for 
large budget films follow strong seasonal trends.  In addition, Einav (2007) has shown 
recently that ticket price rigidity has created an amplification effect making the 
seasonal release pattern even more pronounced. Given the relatively small number of 
films during the time period of our study and the potentially large loss of revenues 
from delays during the critical peak demand seasons, studios had a strong incentive to 
release films in a timely manner in all states. As a result, we did not expect to find 
systematic differences in release dates between blind-bid and trade-screen states.   32
  
  5.1. Data and Methods 
 
  We were unable to determine the full list of movies blind bid during this time 
period. As a result, we selected our data set to minimize the possibility of including 
those movies not blind-bid, while also assuring a large enough sample. There is at 
least anecdotal evidence that the highest grossing movies were blind bid, while the 
worst were trade screened (Bratman, 1980).  As a result, we used data from Variety 
which reported the number of weeks a film was exhibited in a city for the top twenty 
films in each year from 1975 to 1985.  Variety sampled theaters from downtown areas 
and surrounding suburban areas in the cities of Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia.  
For New York City, Variety consistently sampled theaters in Manhattan.23 
 
 5.2  Results 
 
  Table 8 summarizes the impact of Ohio’s law on the relative release dates in 
Cleveland and Detroit. Before passage of the Ohio law, Cleveland exhibited 24 of the 
99 films later than Detroit with an average delay of 3.75 weeks.  After passage of the 
law, only eight films were delayed with the average delay of 1.75 weeks.  In addition, 
before passage of the law Cleveland exhibited eight films before Detroit did and 67 
films were at the same time.  After passage of the law, 60 films were exhibited first in 
                                                 
23In some cases, we were unable to obtain information for all of the top twenty films 
each year.  For example, Benji (1974) was the third highest grossing film in 1975, but 
Variety did not furnish information about its film release pattern for Cleveland, 
Detroit, Philadelphia, and New York City.  In circumstances like this, we included the 
next highest grossing film.    33
Cleveland, and 53 were released at the same time.  The overall average number of 
weeks of delay was only 0.81 before passage of the law and -0.44 after it.  Therefore, 
after passage of the Ohio law, films were even exhibited sooner on average in 
Cleveland than in Detroit.  
 
  Table 9 summarizes similar results for the impact of the Pennsylvania law. 
Philadelphia received films after New York City 47 times with the average delay of 
2.78 weeks prior to the passage of the law. Afterwards there were only six delays with 
an average length of 3.5 weeks.  Prior to passage of the law, there were two instances 
when Philadelphia exhibited a film before New York City and 77 times films were 
exhibited at the same time.  After passage of the law, Philadelphia exhibited a film 
before New York City one time, and 87 times films had the same release date.  For all 
films the average weeks of delay before the passage of the law were 0.52 weeks and 




  Laws banning blind bidding and guarantees were intended to help theater 
owners remain in business.  However, the decline of one and two-screen theaters was 
a trend that the laws could not reverse.  While all theater owners were initially 
affected by the scarcity of new releases and the concentration of blockbuster films into 
a few peak periods, the industry was experiencing important structural changes during 
the time when the laws were being passed.     34
 
  The blockbuster films increased aggregate demand.  In addition, studios 
changed their philosophy on the release pattern of films.  Prior to the passage of the 
laws, films followed a slow release pattern where only a handful of theaters exhibited 
a new release in a limited number of cities during their first-run.  However, over time 
studios changed to a fast release pattern, making first-run films more widely available. 
Through the development of the ancillary markets, cable television and VCRs, the 
decades long product shortage came to an end.  By the early 1980’s new releases were 
consistently double their previous levels of the early blind bidding years.   
 
  Theater owners that remained competitive restructured by converting their 
theaters to the multiplex concept, which increased their likelihood of exhibiting 
blockbuster films and diversified risk.   The econometric results that we present in this 
paper suggest that even the strictest state laws had at most a limited and short-lived 
impact on theater survival.  In addition, we find evidence that admission prices for the 
relatively more successful films were actually somewhat higher in trade-screen states.  
 
  Our results indicate that blind bidding helped those theater owners who had 
diversified, because they benefited from paying lower guarantees on average. In other 
words, trade screening may have actually resulted in higher bid prices for the most 
promising films that these theater owners would have shown anyways. As a result, the 
laws were an unnecessary attempt to protect less efficient theaters from going out of 
business while penalizing those theater owners who had modernized by improving the 
quality of their theaters.  
  Taken as a whole, our results have implications for the literature on market 
concentration, competition, and endogenous investment in quality. For example, U.S.   35
Justice Department’s Assistant Attorney Shenefield in his letter to the Massachusetts 
State Legislature stated a common concern about the changes in market structure at 
the time, “It is not surprising that …only the large chains are still operating profitably.  
Blind bidding appears to contribute to this trend toward concentration of the 
exhibition market”   However, Sutton (1991) has shown that industries can remain 
both competitive and highly concentrated as market size increases over time as long as 
the increase in firm size is due to endogenous investment in quality.24 More recently, 
Ellickson (2007) in an empirical study of supermarket quality using data for the 1990s 
shows that consumers experienced a higher level of quality as supermarkets offered a 
wider selection of products in larger stores, while local markets remained competitive 
despite increasing concentration levels.  
 
As in the case of the movie industry, some states initially attempted to impede 
endogenous quality-enhancing investment in supermarket quality. Using data from 
1974 to 1985, Das, Falaris, and Mulligan (2009) show that as supermarkets made 
endogenous quality-enhancing investments in the first vintages of optical scanner 
technology in the late 1970s and early 1980s, six states passed laws requiring that 
prices be placed on each individual item sold in grocery stores. While these laws were 
intended to save jobs, they slowed down the diffusion of scanner technology at a time 
when stores were starting to install computers linked to the scanner technology. 
 
 Levy et al. (1997) provide additional evidence of the potential harmful effects 
of the laws by comparing the costs of changing prices at supermarkets located in 
Connecticut with those in states without such a law using data for the years 1991 and 
1992.  They determined that stores subject to item pricing laws at that time faced costs 
that were higher than those in states not subject to the law. Using data for 1991, 
Bergen et al. (2004) provide evidence that consumer prices were, on average, ten 
percent higher in states with these laws. 
 
As in the grocery market, the exhibition sector of the motion picture industry 
in local markets became more concentrated when theater owners began investing 
endogenously in quality (that is, number of screens per theater).  Despite the increased 
level of concentration, our results imply that moviegoers were actually better off in 
terms of quality due to a wider selection of films in one location.  These results should 
give policy makers second thoughts prior to intervening to prevent bankruptcy in 
markets undergoing important structural change. 
 
                                                 
24 Our results are also relevant to a growing related literature on how quality and 
product differentiation decisions can affect exit and entry (Toivanen and Waterson, 
2005).   36
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Figure 2  
 

























Source: Encyclopedia of Exhibition (National Association of Theater Owners: annual)   43
Table 1  
 
States that Enacted Laws Banning Blind Bidding 
 
State  Year Enacted  Guarantees Permitted 
Alabama 1978  Yes 
Arkansas 1981  Yes 
Georgia 1979  Yes 
Idaho 1979  No 
Indiana 1980  Yes 
Kansas 1981  Yes 
Kentucky 1980  No 
Louisiana 1978  Yes 
Maine 1979  Yes 
Massachusetts 1979  Yes 
Missouri 1982  Yes 
Montana 1981  No 
New Mexico  1979  Yes 
North Carolina  1979  Yes 
Ohio 1978 No 
Oregon 1979  Yes 
Pennsylvania 1980  No 
South Carolina  1978  Yes 
Tennessee 1979  Yes 
Utah 1979 No 
Virginia 1978  Yes 
Washington 1979  Yes 
West Virginia  1979  Yes 
Wisconsin 1984  No 
 
Source: Encyclopedia of Exhibition (National Association of Theater Owners: annual)   44
Figure 3  
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Table 2  
 




Period 1973 to 1976 (Pre-blind bidding laws)             
                    
   blind (MI,NY)  preview (OH,PA)  OH  MI  PA  NY 
exit rate  19.59%  17.80%  16.67%  18.52%  19.10%  20.29% 
                    
                    
 Period: 1977 to 1985                
                    
   blind (MI,NY)  preview (OH,PA)  OH  MI  PA  NY 
exit rate  57.49%  52.72%  58.37%  50.00%  46.53%  62.19% 
                    
                    
Period: 1977 to 1981                
                    
   blind (MI,NY)  preview (OH,PA)  OH  MI  PA  NY 
exit rate  32.42%  23.40%  26.24%  24.60%  20.30%  37.31%   46
Table 3   
Probit Estimates of the Probability of Exit Between 1977 and 1981 
















































Log L  -133.41   
Cases 228   
 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4  
Probit Estimates of the Probability of Exit between 1977 and 1981 
















































Log L  -411.46   
Cases 750  
 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 10 percent level.   48
Table 5 
  
Duration Model Estimates of Movie Theater Survival  





















































































  -0.49* 














Log L  -975  -951  -877  -870  -1254 
Cases 3453 3453  3447  3447  4860 
 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 10 percent level.   49
Figure 4   
 





























Ohio Law Passed in 1978
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 Table 6 
 
Average Admission Price Before and After Passage of the Ohio Law  
 
Variable  Cleveland 
(1) 
Detroit 
(2)  (1) – (2) 
Mean Price before (1976-77)  2.69 
(0.364) 
3.47 
(0.187)   
Mean Price after (1979-80)  2.85 
(0.451) 
3.54 
(0.101)   






Mean Price before (1975-76)  2.67 
(0.345) 
3.36 
(0.251)   
Mean Price after (1980-81)  2.87 
(0.428) 
3.57 
(0.330)   







Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Figure 5   
 
Average Movie Theater Admission Prices, Philadelphia & Pittsburgh 
































Pennsylvania Law Passed in 1980
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Table 7 
  
Average Admission Price  
















(0.024)   





(0.202)   











(0.171)   





(0.152)   






Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 




















Average Relative Delays in Release Dates in Cleveland Prior to and After Passage 
of the Ohio Law 
 
 Movies  first 





























Prior to passage 





-1.29  68  99 
0.81 
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Table 9 
 
Average Relative Delays in Release Dates in Philadelphia Prior to and After 
Passage of the Pennsylvania Law 
 






























Prior to passage 





-1.00  77  126 
1.03 





-2.00  87 
 
94 
0.20 
 
 